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In a nutshell, macroprudential regulation is made up of two building blocks: surveillance and supervision.
Surveillance is concerned with identifying, assessing and monitoring the build-up of systemic risks, i.e., those
regarding the financial stability of a country or region. Supervision is aimed at preventing, mitigating and managing
systemic risks.
A key lesson from the recent global financial crisis is that correct understanding, timely identification and effective
handling of systemic risks are absolutely critical. This requires sound conceptual frameworks, effective tools to spot
and manage these risks, and competent authorities that are able -and willing- to take prompt action about them.
What does this mean for insurance as a key component of the financial system? What have regulators been doing
with respect to insurance-specific macroprudential regulation? What challenges lie ahead? Let’s consider these
questions.
At a conceptual level, insurance-specific macroprudential regulation takes into consideration the dynamics of the
business as well as the nature of its activities. Insurers cash premiums first and pay claims later. In other words,
when compared to banks, it could be said that insurers do maturity transformation the other way round. Their
business does not create credit, sparing a key headache for those involved in macroprudential work.
Also, in insurance most insurable events like deaths, diseases, work accidents or car crashes are not tied to the -
often cyclical- fluctuations of the economy. Instead, these events show empirical regularities that are inherent in
populations. In other words, these regularities can be identified, calculated and, most importantly, predicted with
reasonable accuracy. This is at the heart of insurance activities, as actuaries draw on population regularities to price
insurance risks (e.g. our life insurance policy or our car insurance policy) and set money aside for future claims.
Summing up, by staying away from credit creation and by structuring their activities based on empirical population
regularities fundamentally foreign to economic fluctuations, insurers are immensely less likely than other financial
sectors, especially banking, to generate systemic risks.
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However, this is not always the case. Three examples can help in this respect. First, life insurers often offer
investment products together with their life insurance policies. We buy these to supplement our pensions, or for
other reasons. But if, as policyholders, we worry about the soundness of our insurer, we may want to cash in these
investments, generating a run on the insurer, in many respects no different from runs on banks triggered by worried
deposit holders.
Second, there are the reinsurers, i.e. insurer’s insurers, which take on so-called catastrophic risks. Catastrophic
risks follow ‘acts of god’ like hurricanes or earthquakes that are difficult to predict. Extremely large catastrophes can
potentially generate risks to the overall financial system. Reinsurers address this matter via, among other things,
diversifying the risks they take. This is a key factor explaining why reinsures like to – or even need to – operate on a
global level, pooling risks from many different corners of the world.
Third, many insures are in the business of insuring credit risk, which, more often than not, is tied to the fluctuations
in the economy instead of responding to population regularities. The graph below, which compiles data from the US
insurance market, illustrates this point. While the loss ratio (i.e. the relation between claims out and premiums in) of
ordinary property and casualty insurers remains largely constant over a period of over 40 years, the loss ratio of
mortgage insurers fluctuates dramatically, largely following the sways of the broader economy.
Source: Ramella and von Dahlen (2014)
Looking into the conceptual nuances of insurance is important in order to better understand where systemic risks
may come from, how they might look, and what could be done about them. In this respect, insurance regulators
have developed and applied a battery of tools , including stress testing individual insurers -and the sector as a
whole- in order to better understand insurers’ ability to, for example, cope with situations where insured events
dramatically part ways with the historical experience of empirical regularities.
In addition, and with particular reference to reinsurance, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS) has been engaged in the largest and longest macroprudential surveillance project know to insurance. Since
2003, it has been on the look out for any build-up of systemic risk in the reinsurance sector. IAIS has systematically
tracked catastrophic risks, credit risks as well as risk management practices by global reinsurers. Crucially, in nearly
15 years of macroprudential activity the IAIS has not identified any systemic risks emerging from the reinsurance
sector. This timely exercise is on-going.
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Moreover, regulators have been engaged in identifying those insurers that due to their size, complexity or the type of
activities they conduct, could be seen as being systemically important. To date, the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
following consultation with the IAIS, has named nine such global systemically important insurers. These insurers are
subjected to enhanced measures, including holding more capital, and following special resolution arrangements. No
reinsurers appear on FSB’s list. National authorities, like the US Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOP), have
been conducting a similar exercise at the domestic level. This has met with some controversy, as one of the three
insurers designated systemically important by FSOP challenged –successfully– the decision in court.
To sum up, there are important nuances that have to be considered when addressing macroprudential regulation in
insurance. Unfortunately, these run the risk of getting overlooked as there is a growing trend among countries to
place institutional responsibility over macroprudential regulation on central banks, which, with a few exceptions, do
not oversee the insurance sector. Going forward, this may well be to the detriment of insurance, in particular its
ability to pool complex risks emerging from an ever more globalised society.
Disclaimer: The views expressed by the author are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bermuda
Monetary Authority or of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. The author remains responsible for
any errors or omissions.
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Notes:
This article is based on the Insurance and Microprudential Regulation: Conceptual Risks, co-authored by
Marcelo Ramella and Sebastien von Dahlen as a chapter in the book Macroprudential Supervision in
Insurance – Theoretical and Practical Aspects, edited by Jan Monkiewicz and Marian Malecki, Palgrave
MacMillan, 2014.
The post gives the views of its author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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